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NOTES
CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY OF A WARD
When a guardian is appointed to manage the property of an adult, the
ward is usually divested of power to contract. Any contract he attempts to
enter after the appointment is generally considered void,' rather than merely
voidable, regardless of his mental capacity. This strict rule does not apply
to an adult incompetent for whom no guardian has been appointed. His
right to avoid contracts (which, for the purposes of this note, will include
contracts, deeds, and sales)' depends upon whether he was able at the time
of the transaction to comprehend the significance of his actions.' The stricter
rule is applied to wards because the primary purpose of appointing a guard-
1. The following are jurisdictions which treat the subsequent contracts as void:
ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 43 (1958); CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40 (Deering 1960); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-21 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-73 (1960); DEL.
CODE ANN. fit. 12, § 3914 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.22(10) (1965); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-206 (1964); HAwAII REV. LAws § 338-15 (1955); IDAHo CODE ANN. §
32-108 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 126 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 8-141 (1953); Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 202.145 (1963); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 3604 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.543 (Supp. 1967); Mo. REV. STAT. §
475.345 (1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 64-112 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-304
(1960); NED. REv. STAT. § 41.300 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 462:27 (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:22-1 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-01-03 (1960);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.04 (Page 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, §§ 11, 22,
24 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 50, § 3511 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-13
(1956); S.D. CODE § 30.0803 (1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2689 (1959); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 319.215 (1958).
Traditionally, subsequent contracts are classified as either void or voidable. One
recent case, however, would place the Maryland statute (MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, §§
149-53 (1957)) in neither of these classifications. Edmunds v. Equitable Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 223 A.2d 630 (D.C. 1966). The court relied on the fact that the statute spe-
cifically stated that a ward is not necessarily of unsound mind and that this statute was
enacted after the courts had ruled that only persons of unsound mind lack capacity to
contract. The court also noted the conspicuous absence of any provision rendering all
contracts by the ward void or indicating that the appointment of a conservator relieved
the ward of his capacity to contract. All of this led the court to the conclusion that, in
Maryland, the acts of an adult person for whom a guardian has been appointed are no
less valid and enforceable. Id. at 632. The Maryland courts have not, as yet, interpreted
their own statute. If the District of Columbia court's interpretation is accepted, this is
a new type of statute which renders contracts neither void nor voidable and which raises
no presumption as to the contractual capacity of a ward.
2. No distinction is made between contracts, deeds, and sales; since they are all
consensual transactions, common principles apply and are dealt with in the term
"contract."
3. Note, Mental illness and the Law of Contracts, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1021 (1959).
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ian is to protect the ward's property.4 The simplicity of the general rule is,
as with all general rules, deceiving. It is the purpose of this note to examine
in what situations a court will affirm the contractual acts of an adult ward
despite the prior appointment of a guardian' and to suggest a means of re-
ducing the confusion and unfairness of the law in this area.
I. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A GUARDIAN WILL BE APPOINTED
The tests for determining when a guardian can be appointed are laid
down either in state statutes or in the common law of the state. Many
courts, in spite of these guidelines, have been reluctant to appoint guardians
and thereby restrain the ward's liberty and right to control his property.'
Under the statutes and the common law, the test employed most often for
the appointment of a guardian is the ability of the alleged incompetent to
manage and preserve his property.7
In addition to this broad general criterion, statutes often incorporate
several other tests. These include the ability of the person to cope with
"designing persons,"8 and the likelihood that such persons will dissipate or
lose his property.' These tests may be used independently of the general
test'0 or in conjunction with it as an aid in determining when the person is
incompetent to manage his property." Even when the statute does not ex-
4. See In re Cleveland, 72 Conn. 340, 44 A. 476 (1899); Emerick v. Emerick, 83
Iowa 411, 49 N.W. 1017 (1891). This is true even though there are separate pro-
visions for guardianship of the person and the estate. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODn §§
1460-61 (Deering Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 266, 271 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1967). There appears to be no difference in the effect of subsequent contracts depending
upon whether the guardian was appointed for the person or the estate. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. § 45-73 (1960); Mo. REv. STAT. § 475.345 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 319.215 (1958). The functions of a guardian have little relationship with the con-
tractual capacity of the ward. The majority of the jurisdictions consider any act
subsequent to the appointment void, regardless of the functions of the guardian.
5. In some states the term "committee," "conservator," or "curator" is used instead
of "guardian." See In re Hogan, 135 Me. 249, 194 A. 854 (1937); In re Evan's Estate,
28 Wis. 2d 97, 135 N.W.2d 832 (1965). There is some justification for the distinction
between guardianship and conservatorship. To some extent, they have been defined
differently. See Lord, Conservatorship v. Guardianship, 33 L.A.B. BULL. 5 (Nov. 1957).
But, for the purpose of this note, the term "guardian" will be used.
6. In re Valentine's Guardianship, 4 Utah 2d 335, 294 P.2d 696 (1956); In re
Reed, 173 Wis. 628, 182 N.W. 329 (1929).
7. See, e.g., In re Cleveland, 72 Conn. 340, 44 A. 476 (1899); Snyder v. Snyder,
142 II. 60, 31 N.E. 303 (1892); Olson v. Olson, 242 Iowa 192, 46 N.W.2d 1 (1951);
Rhoads v. Rhoads, 29 Ohio App. 449, 163 N.E. 724 (1927).
8. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-861 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 12, §
3914 (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. § 126.005 (1957).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.22(1)
(1960); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 50, § 3102(3) (Supp. 1967).
10. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.22(1) (1960).
11. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914 (1953).
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pressly include these latter tests, the courts will often consider the results of
such tests as evidence on the issue of whether the alleged incompetent is
able to manage and preserve his property. The fact that one is unable to
cope with unscrupulous persons with whom he is likely to come in contact
will justify the appointment of a guardian under the "designing persons"
provision or under the general test." However, the disposition of one's
property in a manner not approved by his family or not consonant with
normal business practices is insufficient to justify the appointment of a
guardian.'3 None of the tests require a showing of insanity, 4 although
such a showing will support an appointment. 5
Most statutes incorporate one or more of the above tests and attempt to
list the type of deficiency or infirmity which will justify the appointment of
a guardian. A typical statute is that of California which provides:
Any superior court to which application is made . . . may appoint a
guardian for the person of an insane or an incompetent person, who is
a resident of the State. As used in this division of this code, the phrase
"incompetent person," "incompetent," or "mentally incompetent,"
shall be construed to mean or refer to any person, whether insane or
not, who by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or other
cause, is unable, unassisted, properly to manage and take care of himself
or his property, and by reason thereof is likely to be deceived or im-
posed upon by artful or designing persons.'
12. See In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 P. 352 (1913); In re Cassidy, 95 Cal. App.
641, 273 P. 69 (1928); In re Wolff's Guardianship, 232 Minn. 144, 44 N.W.2d 465
(1950); In re Guardianship of Bayer's Estate, 101 Wash. 694, 172 P. 842 (1918).
13. See In re Waite's Guardianship, 14 Cal. 2d 727, 97 P. 2d 238 (1939); Steven-
son v. Peckham, 322 Mass. 693, 79 N.E.2d 282 (1948). But see In re Berge's Guardi-
anship, 165 Minn. 103, 205 N.W. 886 (1925).
14. See In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 P. 352 (1913); In re Green's Guardianship,
125 Wash. 570, 216 P. 843 (1923); In re Streiff, 119 Wis. 566, 97 N.W. 189 (1903).
It has been suggested that the terms used in guardianship statutes are objectionable
and tend to stigmatize the incompetent (Lord, supra note 5; Note, Guardianship in the
Planned Estate, 45 IowA L. Rzv. 360, 368 (1960)) and, since many of these terms
are nearly interchangeable, that the statutes ought simply to designate as incompetent
any person who is mentally incapable of taking care of himself. Note, Appointment of
Guardians for the Mentally Incompetent, 1964 DuKE L.J. 342. While admitting that
the statutory terms are vague and lacking in definitional certainty, relying solely on
the general test of guardianship creates additional problems. The general rule empha-
sizes the intellectual process and underestimates the significance of the emotional insta-
bility which is characteristic of certain forms of disorders. See Guttmacher & Weihofen,
Mental Incompetency, 36 MINN. L. R-v. 179 (1952). To limit the test solely to the
general test would further emphasize the intellectual process and would destroy mean-
ingful distinctions not only betwen insanity and incompetency (see Lord, supra note 5)
but also the distinction betwen mental and physical incompetency. See Anderson v.
State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939).
15. See, e.g., Willett v. Willett, 333 Mass. 323, 130 N.E.2d 582 (1955); Jones v.
Maguire, 221 Mass. 315, 108 N.E. 1073 (1915).
16. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (Deering Supp. 1967).
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Twenty-seven jurisdictions provide by statute for the appointment of a
guardian when habitual drunkenness or narcotics addiction seriously impairs
the individual's judgment.' Ten jurisdictions provide for the appointment
of guardians for spendthrifts."5 A spendthrift is defined as a person who by
excessive drinking, gambling, idleness, or debauchery, has become incapable
of managing his own affairs, or who spends or wastes his estate so as to
expose himself or his family to want or suffering or his town to expense."
That an individual is easily influenced, lacks understanding of the extent of
his property,2" or is an alcoholic and has associated with disreputable charac-
ters2' have been held sufficient grounds for the appointment of a guardian.
The jurisdictions are divided as to whether old age or other physical dis-
abilities will justify the appointment of a guardian. One state has held that
a statute establishing old age or physical disability as the only criteria for
the appointment of a guardian contravened state constitutional provisions
concerning the right to acquire, possess, and protect property.22 No state
presently provides for the appointment of a guardian on the basis of physical
disability or old age without an additional finding of inability to manage
one's estate. 3 Twenty-four states provide for appointment in cases of old
age or senility when such defects render the person unable to manage his
property. 4 Eleven of these states also specifically provide for appointment
17. F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 239-51
(1961) (hereinafter cited as LINDMAN). In addition to those statutes cited in LINDMAN,
see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2682 (Supp. 1967); WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.88.010
(1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3-29.1 (Supp. 1967).
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 113 (Snith-Hurd 1961); IoWA CODE ANN. § 633.552
(1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. fit. 18, § 3601(2) (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.54
(1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-302 (1960); N.H. RKv. STAT. ANN. § 464:6 (1955);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-02(3) (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-8 (1956);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2682 (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 319.03 (1958).
19. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464:5 (1955).
20. Modich v. Jennings, 244 Mass. 183, 138 N.E. 897 (1923).
21. In re Buck, 171 Minn. 227, 213 N.W. 898 (1927).
22. Schafer v. Hailer, 108 Ohio St. 243, 140 N.E. 517 (1923); see 37 HARv. L. REv.
151 (1923).
23. See Griffin v. Collins, 122 Ga. 102, 49 S.E. 827 (1905); Upton v. Bush, 135
Ky. 102, 121 S.W. 1005 (1909); In re Storick, 64 Mich. 685, 31 N.W. 582 (1887);
Keiser v. Keiser, 113 Neb. 645, 204 N.W. 394 (1925). But see Loss v. Loss, 25 Ill.
2d 515, 185 N.E.2d 228 (1962); Silver v. Newcomer, 80 Ind. App. 406, 140 N.E.
455 (1923).
24. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-861 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-601 (Supp.
1967) ; CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (Deering Supp. 1967) ; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1
(1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914(a) (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.03
(1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §
8-101(c) (1953); Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 387.010 (1963); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 149 (1966); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAws ch. 201, § 16 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
525.54 (1947); Mo. Rv. STAT. § 475.010 (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-201 (1959);
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in cases of physical incapacity." The majority of appellate cases upholding
the appointment of a guardian due to physical incapacity have been cases
in which the person is also old and there has, consequently, been a reduc-
tion of mental capacity. 6 The courts usually have not discussed the issues
of mental and physical disability separately." Normally, a physical ailment
will not justify the appointment of a guardian unless it is such that the
person has no control over his body functions and must remain bedridden."
In one case, however, a guardian was appointed for one who was deaf and
dumb because he was unable to manage his affairs.29
II. EFFECT OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN
A. Constructive Notice of Contractual Incapacity
The proceeding to appoint a guardian, being in rem to fix status, serves,
in most states, as constructive notice to those dealing with the ward of his
contractual incapacity." However, in eleven jurisdictions the proceeding
will be considered as constructive notice only if the appointment is ac-
companied by filing of notice.3 ' Filing, when required, usually takes place
in the court or county of adjudication, though four states have a central
NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 159.100 (1963); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 100 (McKinney
Supp. 1966); Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.01 (Page 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. §
126.006 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 3101, 3102 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 33-15-44 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-13-19, -20 (1943); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37-140 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010 (1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
3-29.1 (1967).
25. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914(a)
(Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.03 (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 112
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-101(c) (1953); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 387.010 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 149 (1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 201, § 16 (1955); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.01 (Page 1966); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37-140 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3-29.1 (1967).
26. See, e.g., In re McConnell's Estate, 26 Cal. App. 2d 102, 78 P.2d 1043 (1938);
In re Thoreson's Guardianship, 72 N.D. 101, 4 N.W.2d 822 (1942); Pruett v. Pruett,
291 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
27. See, e.g., In re McConnell's Estate, 26 Cal. App. 2d 102, 78 P.2d 1043 (1938);
In re Thoreson's Guardianship, 72 N.D. 101, 4 N.W.2d 822 (1942); Pruett v. Pruett,
291 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
28. See, e.g., Loss v. Loss, 25 Ill. 2d 515, 185 N.E.2d 228 (1962); Silver v. New-
comer, 80 Ind. App. 406, 140 N.E. 455 (1923); Morse v. Slocum, 192 Iowa 1080,
186 N.W. 22 (1922).
29. In re Perrine, 41 N.J. Eq. 409, 5 A. 579 (Ch. 1886).
30. See, e.g., Hellman Commercial Trust & Say. Bank v. Alden, 206 Cal. 592, 275
P. 794 (1929); Leggate v. Clark, 111 Mass. 308 (1873); Martello v. Cagliostro, 122
Misc. 306, 202 N.Y.S. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Hinton v. Robinson, 51 Tenn. App. 1,
364 S.W.2d 97 (1963).
31. See LINDMAN, at 239.
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registration office. 2 Whether or not a jurisdiction requires filing, the en-
forceability of contracts subsequently entered into by the ward does not
depend on the other party receiving actual notice of the guardianship.
B. Impact of Appointment on Subsequent Contracts of Ward
1. Void Rule
With the exception of contracts for necessities,3" if the statute under which
the adjudication was had expressly or by implication declares the subse-
quent contracts of the incompetent void, theoretically, they are void regard-
less of whether the appointments are because of mental or physical in-
capacity. 3
4
a. rationale of the rule. A variety of reasons have been offered to
justify statutes which declare the ward's subsequent contracts void. It is
clear that the law aims to protect the person and property of one who is
incapable of doing so himself." The statutory voidness rule is said to be
32. Mo. REv. STAT. § 475.140 (1956); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 135.40 (1964);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.29 (Page Supp. 1966); VA. CODe ANN. § 37-136.2
(Supp. 1966).
33. One common exception to the rule that the ward's contracts are void is created
by statute. This exception concerns contracts for necessities. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7,
§ 106 (1958). If the guardian has neglected or refused to provide necessities, the ward
may be liable for those furnished to him by a third person. See Belluci v. Foss, 244
Mass. 401, 138 N.E. 551 (1923); Bowman v. Bowman, 96 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936); Linch v. Sanders, 114 W. Va. 726, 173 S.E. 788 (1934). The courts
have based the ward's liability on quasi-contract. Because a quasi-contract is implied
by law, consent of the ward is unnecessary to its existence or enforceability. Turpin's
Adm'r v. Stringer, 228 Ky. 32, 14 S.W.2d 189 (1929). Liability under quasi-contract
is limited to actual or reasonable value of the necessities or the benefit received. See, e.g.,
Dean v. Estate of Atwood, 221 Iowa 1388, 212 N.W. 371 (1927); Carter v. Beckwith,
128 N.Y. 312, 28 N.E. 582 (1891). But see McCormick v. Littler, 85 Ill. 62 (1877).
Much discretion is left with the courts in determining what are necessities, but the term
includes everything reasonably commensurate with the ward's normal maintainance and
position in life. Leonard v. Alexander, 50 Cal. App. 2d 385, 122 P.2d 984 (1942) (at-
torney's fees); Collins v. Marquette Trust Co., 187 Minn. 514, 246 N.W. 5 (1932)
(attorney's fees); McCulIy v. McCully, 175 Miss. 876, 168 So. 608 (1936) (board,
nursing, clothing, taxes on land); In re Weightman's Estate, 126 Pa. Super. 221, 190 A.
552 (1937) (medical and legal services).
34. See Ure v. Ure, 223 Ill. 454, 79 N.E. 153 (1906) (drunkard); Waitt v. Badger,
318 Mass. 101, 60 N.E.2d 375 (1945) (spendthrift); Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass.
508 (1867) (spendthrift); Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y. 67, 22 N.B. 446 (1889) (drunk-
ard). But see Jones v. Semple, 91 Ala. 182, 8 So. 557 (1890). Such statutes have
been interpreted as applicable even to contracts entered into prior to the appointment.
In re Thornton's Guardianship, 243 Wis. 397, 10 N.W.2d 193 (1943). Contra, Der
Hagopian v. Eskandarian, 396 Pa. 401, 153 A.2d 897 (1959); see Stroudsburg Security
Trust Co. v. Symonds, 3 Monroe L. Rptr. 47 (Pa. C.P. 1941).
35. Schultz v. Oldenburg, 202 Minn. 237, 277 N.W. 918 (1938).
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justified by convenience and necessity. It is argued that without such a
provision the acts of the guardian and ward might conflict 8 and the guar-
dian would be unable properly to discharge his duties. 7 It is also argued
that this rule makes it unnecessary to relitigate the question of the capacity
of the ward as to each transaction. The effect of this rule has also been
justified on the ground that any loss occasioned by void contracts is better
borne by businessmen than the estate of the ward. 9
Besides convenience and necessity, the rule may be defended on tradi-
tional contract theory. The fundamental idea of a contract requires the
assent of two minds. But "a lunatic, or a person non compos mentis, has
nothing which the law recognizes as a mind, and.., therefore, ... cannot
make a contract which may have any efficacy as such."4 Many of the
cases which have held the subsequent contract of a ward void have utilized
this reasoning.",
b. exceptions. Realizing that a rule making void all subsequent con-
tracts of a ward can produce injustice,42 many courts have avoided literal
application of the statutes. In so doing, they have used a variety of argu-
ments: that no reliable determination of incompetency was ever made;
that, although a determination of incompetency was made at the time of ap-
pointment, the conditions or capacity of the ward may have changed; that
the transaction was not the type which was meant to be rendered unenforce-
able by the guardianship proceeding; and that public policy warrants the
enforcement of the contract.
The most frequent argument which the courts use in upholding the con-
tracts of a ward is that there was no reliable determination of incompetency.
Thus, a ward's contracts have been enforced when there was no specific
finding at the statutory proceedings of his incapacity to manage his property.
The appointment of a guardian for one mentally disabled without a finding
of non compos mentis has been held not to render the contracts of the ward
36. Martello v. Cogiostro, 122 Misc. 306, 202 N.Y.S. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
37. Reeves v. Hunter, 185 Iowa 958, 171 N.W. 567 (1919); Johnson v. Johnson,
214 Minn. 462, 8 N.W.2d 620 (1943).
38. Leonard v. Leonard, 30 Mass. (14 Pick.) 280 (1833).
39. Gibson v. Soper, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 279 (1856).
40. Dexter v. Hall 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 9 (1872). See also Cook, Mental Deficiency
and the English Law of Contract, 21 COLUme. L. REv. 424 (1921); Green, The Oper-
ative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills, 21 T=XAs L. Rv. 554,
555 (1943).
41. See, e.g., Christian v. Waiaua Agricultural Co., 93 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1937),
rev'd on other grounds, 305 U.S. 91 (1938); Bowman v. Wade, 54 Ore. 347, 103 P.
72 (1909).
42. Schultz v. Oldenburg, 202 Minn. 237, 277 N.W. 918 (1938); Thorpe v. Hans-
corn, 64 Minn. 201, 66 N.W. 1 (1896).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
void." In states whose statutes authorize the appointment of a guardian
for persons not of unsound mind," it has been held that appointment is not
an adjudication of mental incompetence unless there was a specific finding
to that effect.45 Courts have also held that when the guardian was ap-
pointed upon the ward's voluntary application, there being no determina-
tion of competence, the guardian is treated as a trustee or agent and the
ward is not rendered incompetent to make contracts." Several courts which
adhere to the view that appointment without a finding of incompetence does
not render subsequent contracts void have found support in the fact that
statutory provisions limiting contractual capacity do not extend to persons
of sound mind.4 The fact that the ward is under guardianship in these
jurisdictions does not prevent him from performing the acts of which he is
in fact capable."
The courts will also look to the propriety of the adjudication to evade
the express statutory language. If there has been a procedural defect in the
adjudication of incompetency, as for example, when the ward has not been
served with process,49 the court may treat the situation as if there had been
no guardian appointed." If there has been an unauthorized and void is-
suance of letters of guardianship, no presumption is raised concerning the
validity of subsequent contracts of the ward. 1
Another argument frequently used by the courts is that, although a guard-
ian was appointed and there was a finding of incapacity, the situation and
the capacity of the ward have changed. Thus, courts will often determine
whether there was a guardianship actually functioning at the time of the
contract negotiations." In many states, the void rule takes the form of a
43. Crary v. Goldsmith, 322 Mich. 418, 34 N.W.2d 28 (1948); In re Gabler's Estate,
265 Wis. 31, 60 N.W.2d 342 (1953).
44. Aviz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-861 (1956); CAL. PRoB. CODE § 1460 (Deering
Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914 (Supp. 1966); D.C. CODE ENOYO. §
21-1501 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 149 (1966); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 201, § 16 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-2-1 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-13-20
(1953); see Edmunds v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 223 A.2d 630 (D.C. 1966);
Carroll v. District Court, 50 Mont. 428, 147 P. 612 (1915).
45. Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1960).
46. In re Ridpath's Guardianship, 231 Iowa 977, 2 N.W.2d 651 (1942).
47. In re Sherrill's Estate, 92 Ariz. 39, 373 P.2d 353 (1962); In re Kappel's Guard-
ianship, 242 Iowa 1021, 47 N.W.2d 825 (1951).
48. Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1960); In re
Sherrill's Estate, 92 Ariz. 39, 373 P.2d 353 (1962); In re Kappel's Guardianship, 242
Iowa 1021, 47 N.W.2d 825 (1951).
49. Hinton v. Robinson, 51 Tenn. App. 1, 364 S.W.2d 97 (1963).
50. Id. at 8, 364 S.W.2d at 100.
51. Watson v. Banks, 154 Ark. 396, 243 S.W. 844 (1922).
52. Field v. Koonce, 178 Ark. 862, 12 S.W.2d 772 (1929); Nichols v. Clement
Mortgage Co., 112 Okla. 155, 241 P. 167 (1925).
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conclusive presumption of contractual incapacity accompanying the ap-
pointment of a guardian. This presumption continues until the person is
adjudged competent in a subsequent adjudication53 notwithstanding the
fact that the contract was made during a lucid interval," or that the ward
was in fact competent.55 These presumptions, however, should logically be
applied only if the guardianship proceeding requires a finding of incapacity
and there has been no subsequent change in the capacity of the ward. Thus,
the courts have applied these presumptions only when the guardianship is
an active one. The rules have no application when there is proof that the
incompetency has ceased and that the guardianship, although not termin-
ated, has been abandoned."
Many courts, admitting that the guardianship is conclusive of incom-
petence in ordinary business transactions, have avoided the statutory rule of
voidness by using the argument that the act in question was not an ordinary
business transaction. Contracts which are personal in nature are not con-
sidered ordinary business transactions and have been held to fall outside the
statutory rule if the ward is competent to perform the act in question57 and
the contract does not immediately affect the estate." On the basis of this
reasoning wards have been able to acquire a new domicile,' enter a mar-
53. See National Life Ins. Co. v. Jayne, 132 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 761 (1943); Hellman Commercial Trust & Say. Bank v. Alden, 206 Cal.
592, 275 P. 794 (1929). But see Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kan. 483, 487, 43 P. 779, 781
(1895), in which it was held that "An adjudication of restoration by the probate court
is not indispensable, but the presumption of continued insanity may be overcome by
other evidence."
54. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jago, 280 Mich. 360, 273 N.W. 599 (1937);
Coleman v. Farrar, 112 Mo. 54, 20 S.W. 441 (1892).
55. Topeka Water Supply Co. v. Root, 56 Kan. 187, 42 P. 715 (1895); Gibson v.
Soper, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 279 (1856); Moore v. Coleman, 128 W. Va. 223, 36 S.E.2d
593 (1946).
56. Field v. Koonce, 178 Ark. 862, 12 S.W.2d 772 (1929); Gibson v. Soper, 72 Mass.
(6 Gray) 279 (1856); Thorpe v. Hanscom, 64 Minn. 201, 66 N.W. 1 (1896);
Southern Tier Masonic Relief Ass'n v. Laudenbach, 5 N.Y.S. 901 (Sup. Ct. 1889);
Nichols v. Clement Mortgage Co., 112 Okla. 155, 241 P. 167 (1925). Contra, Kiebne
v. Wessell, 53 Mo. App. 667 (1893); see Redden v. Baker, 86 Ind. 191 (1882). It
would appear that a guardian cannot give a blanket authorization to his ward to transact
business as though he were competent, such authorization amounting to an abandon-
ment. Coleman v. Farrar, 112 Mo. 54, 20 S.W. 441 (1892).
57. Concord v. Rumney, 45 N.H. 423 (1864); see Green, Judicial Tests of Mental
Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REv. 141 (1941).
58. Johnson v. Johnson, 214 Minn. 462, 8 N.W.2d 620 (1943); In re Bean's Estate,
159 Wis. 67, 149 N.W. 745 (1914).
59. Groseclose v. Rice, 366 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1961). The statute provided that the
ward could not change residence within the state without the guardian's approval, but
the court held that the statute was inapplicable when the ward moved to a different
state.
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riage, 6 and make a valid will.6 A ward has been held capable of changing
the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, because this was not a contractual
act but more like the making of a will.62 All of these acts have been enforced
in spite of contrary statutory language" and the fact that most of these acts
are consensual and may ultimately affect the estate of the ward.
2. Voidable Rule
Some courts have held,6 and some statutes provide,6" that an adjudication
of incompetency and appointment of a guardian is only prima facie evi-
dence of the ward's incapacity to enter into a subsequent contract. It raises
merely a rebuttable presumption to this effect.66 Thus, in determining
enforceability, the trier of fact considers both the existence and remoteness
of such an adjudication, as well as all the other evidence in the case. 7 Even
if incompetency is established, it renders the contract merely voidable 8 and,
hence, subject to ratification by the guardian." The theory which the
courts have relied on in adopting this position is that the adjudication is
only conclusive as of the time it is rendered and the parties can show that
at a later time the contractual capacity of the ward has been restored.70
"Theoretically this position may be sound since mental disorder, like any
other illness, may have its ups and downs and may have disappeared en-
tirely before the guardianship was terminated."7 1
60. Payne v. Burdette, 84 Mo. App. 332 (1900); Banker v. Banker, 63 N.Y. 409
(1875); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255 App. Div. 366, 8 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1938); Roether
v. Roether, 180 Wis. 24, 191 N.W. 576 (1923) ; see Annot., 28 A.L.R. 631 (1924).
61. In re Bean's Estate, 159 Wis. 67, 149 N.W. 745 (1914). Contra, Sims v. Sims,
121 N.C. 297, 28 S.E. 407 (1897). For a full discussion of the test of testamentary
capacity, see Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1114 (1963).
62. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Schlieper, 284 Ill. App. 411, 2 N.E.2d 169 (1936).
63. Groseclose v. Rice, 366 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1961) (change in domicile); Roether v.
Roether, 180 Wis. 24, 191 N.W. 576 (1923) (marriage); In re Bean's Estate, 159
Wis. 67, 149 N.W. 745 (1914) (will).
64. See, e.g., Field v. Lucas, 21 Ga. 447 (1857); Turpin's Adm'r v. Stringer, 228 Ky.
32, 14 S.W.2d 189 (1929); Clark v. Trail, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 35 (1858).
65. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 126.280 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34.1014 (Supp.
1967). There is some question, however, as to the Tennessee statute, this section as
yet not having been interpreted by the courts. Compare Note, Mental Illness and the
Law of Contracts, 57 MicH. L. REv. 1020, 1083 (1959) (voidable), with Note, Mental
Illness and Contract Law, 29 TENN. L. REv. 274, 277 (1962) (void).
66. Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 369 (D. Miss.
1943).
67. See Lindberg v. Mutual Nat'l Bank, 318 Ill. App. 195, 47 N.E.2d 551 (1943).
68. Mason v. Graves, 167 Ark. 678, 265 S.W. 667 (1924).
69. Eagle v. Peterson, 136 Ark. 72, 206 S.W. 55 (1918).
70. See id.; Davenport v. Jenkins' Comm., 214 Ky. 716, 283 S.W. 1044 (1926).
71. Green, supra note 40, at 579.
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III. CRITIQUE
A. General Criticism
Strict application of the rules accepted in most jurisdictions-that all con-
tracts entered into by an individual for whom a guardian has been appointed
are void, and that the guardianship proceedings are constructive notice of
the ward's contractual incapacity-would in many situations result in ob-
vious unfairness. The void rule and the constructive notice aspect of guard-
ianship cases are unfair for several reasons. First, when a ward's incapacity
is due to mental illness, he may lack contractual capacity only during an
acute episode. 2 Second, if a person does lack contractual capacity at the
time of appointment, his condition may improve with the passage of time."
Third, even if a person lacks contractual capacity, his behavior may be
"appropriate" and thus a reasonable second party would not suspect lack
of competence. 4 The unfairness is particularly obvious when the other
party entered into the transaction in good faith with no actual notice of
the ward's incapacity or when the enforcement of the transaction would in
no significant way diminsh the estate. The cases suggest that the courts,
aware of the unfairness in such results, frequently struggle to avoid strict
application of the rules, often with strained results. 5 The problem could
be greatly alleviated by revision of several aspects of guardianship law.
Many of the problems arise because guardianship is used for a variety
of purposes, some of which bear no or only minimal relationship to the
capacity of the ward to enter into legal transactions. In some of these situa-
tions the use of guardianship seems clearly inappropriate. Thus, the plight
of a person who is only physically disabled should be handled by some
process other than guardianship. Most appropriate, perhaps, would be a
proceeding whereby a court, concluding that a prospective ward was not
incapable of making decisions as to the use of his property but was in dan-
ger of losing his estate because of physical inability to manage it, could ap-
point an "agent."76 Unlike a guardian, the agent would not substitute his
72. Note, Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts, 57 MioH. L. REv. 1020, 1083-88
(1959).
73. Green, supra note 40, at 579.
74. See LINDMAN, at 239-51; R. WHITE, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 496 (1964);
Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE
L.J. 271 (1944).
75. See text accompanying notes 42-63 supra.
76. Note, Guardianship in the Planned Estate, 45 IowA L. Rv. 360, 367 (1960).
These suggestions are accepted in a comment to the Model Probate Code. The comment
states that "no matter how far a person may be incapacitated physically he can manage
his property and care for himself by an agent or servants if his mind is unimpaired. If
so he does not need a guardian." MODEL PROBATE CODE § 196, Comment ( 1946).
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judgment for that of the ward in the management of the ward's property;
rather, his duty would be to perform the physical acts required for manage-
ment of the estate in accordance with the wishes of the ward. Obviously,
the appointment of such an agent, unrelated to the ward's mental capacity
to enter into legal transactions, should in no way affect the enforceability of
transactions into which the ward himself enters.
Once the problem of the physically disabled is met, the determination of
for whom a guardian should be appointed becomes difficult. Most trouble-
some are spendthrifts, alcoholics, and drug addicts. It seems likely that the
decision to deprive such individuals of control over their property is based
partly on a belief that their behavior indicates a mental condition which
impairs their judgment.7" It may be true, however, in these types of cases,
that guardianship is also a method of controlling a type of conduct deemed
socially undesirable without regard to the individual's mental condition."'
For this reason, it is suggested that persons possessing these disorders should
not be grouped with the mentally ill and deficient for purposes of guardian-
ship."' An agency arrangement, with the agent subject to the whim of a
person possessing these disorders, would obviously not present a viable solu-
tion to the problems presented in these types of cases. Probably the most
satisfactory solution is to consider such illnesses as an indication of con-
tractual incapacity and to treat the contracts as voidable in accordance with
the principles to be discussed for mental incompetents.
The most appropriate way to attack the problems inherent in guardian-
ship is to carefully redefine the criteria for the appointment of a guardian
and the effects of such an appointment. The objective is to balance the
social interests which justify depriving an individual of control of his prop-
erty against the unfairness to third parties of denying the enforceability of
contracts with those whom society has determined should be deprived of
control over their estates.
B. Suggested Criteria
Statutes should require that prior to the appointment of a guardian, the
court find that the ward fits into one of two categories. The first category
would require that the prospective ward be shown to be unlikely to man-
age his estate in a manner reasonably calculated to assure continued ability
to support himself and anyone for whose support he is legally responsible.
This would be independent of mental capacity to contract. The category
would include not only those whose anticipated dissipation would be caused
77. Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939).
78. Id.
79. See LINDmAN, at 220.
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by mental incapacity, but it would also encompass the "spendthrift" whose
actions may be unrelated to any abnormal mental condition. Since the social
interest protected by this category of wardship is preventing individuals
from becoming social charges, there is no reason to restrict its use to those
cases where the individual is suffering from a demonstrable mental in-
capacity.
The second category would be composed of those who fail to qualify in
the first group, but who, by reason of lack of mental capacity, are likely to
be taken unfair advantage of by others. The interest protected at the ex-
pense of the ward's freedom of action would be largely private: the right
of those who will eventually receive the property through gift or in-
heritance to its preservation. To some extent, of course, social interests in
discouraging unconscionable conduct of those who would take unfair ad-
vantage of an incompetent and in encouraging economically valuable use
of resources are also vindicated. This category differs from the first in that
it is the individual's mental incapacity that justifies state intervention-thus,
the emphasis in its administration should be on a reliable determination of
the prospective ward's capacity to contract.
C. Suggested Change in Effect of Appointment
1. Constructive Notice
Constructive notice is unfair in guardianship cases for several reasons.
First, there is no way to make the status of the ward apparent to third
persons. Second, present filing and publication requirements are inadequate
and do little to alleviate the unfairness in guardianship cases. In over half
the jurisdictions no filing whatsoever is required." Even in jurisdictions in
which filing and notice are required, such requirements are inadequate. For
example, in one jurisdiction notice need only be given by posting in three
public places."' In addition, in most jurisdictions, filing is required only in
that county or court in which the guardian has been appointed." In such
jurisdictions, an innocent party who conscientiously attempts to ascertain
whether a guardianship exists will have to make a complete investigation of
the records of every county.s
Several steps should be taken to improve the effectiveness of such tech-
niques. Requiring newspaper publication of the adjudication of incom-
80. Id.
81. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2689 (1959).
82. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3704 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
59-2274 (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 319.215 (Supp. 1967).
83. See Schultz v. Oldenberg, 202 Minn. 237, 277 N.W. 918 (1938).
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petency along with a system of central registration 4 would reduce the diffi-
culty of determining the ward's status. Of course, these suggestions do not
present a substitute for actual notice. The substantive law should, there-
fore, make actual notice a determinative factor on the question of the en-
forceability of a ward's contract whenever this can be done without sacrific-
ing important social interests.
2. Validity of Contracts
Since the two criteria suggested above for appointment of a guardian
represent significantly different social interests, the effect of the appointment
on subsequent contracts of the ward should depend to some extent upon in
which category the ward has been placed.
Where the guardian has been appointed because the ward is within the
first category, the most appropriate rule would be that the guardian has the
right to avoid transactions of the ward. The purpose of the appointment
is the protection of the social interest in preserving the estate, thereby pre-
venting the person from becoming a public burden. A guardian would not
have been appointed except upon a showing of specific danger to that social
interest. Therefore, it would seem justifiable to permit the guardian to
avoid contracts which he, in his discretion, believes are disadvantageous to
the estate, despite occasional unfairness to persons who have, in good faith,
entered into such transactions with the ward.
When the appointing court has found that the ward is within the second
category, however, a different approach might well be taken. Here, the
estate being large enough to account for the needs of the ward during his
lifetime, the social interest being protected is of significantly less weight.
While the proceeding will have established as a fact that the individual
lacked contractual capacity at the time of appointment of a guardian, it is
possible that the incapacity will not remain constant. The less important
social interest plus the unreliability of the prior determination of incapacity
should require that an individual who has in good faith, i.e., without actual
notice of the guardianship, contracted with the ward have the right to a de
novo determination of the ward's contractual capacity at the time of the
transaction and, if the ward was in fact competent, to enforcement of the
contract.
If the court finds that the ward lacked contractual capacity at the time
of the transaction, the guardian should be permitted to avoid the obligation
84. Only four jurisdictions have installed a system of central registration, and one
of these pertains only to incompetents who have been hospitalized. Two other states
have attempted to mitigate the problem of notice by requiring newspaper publication of
the incompetency adjudication. LINDMAN, at 226.
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if he can show that a reasonable man, with the information available to the
ward, would not have entered into the transaction. The fact that the trans-
action subsequently proved disadvantageous would be evidence of, but not
conclusive as to, whether the guardian could avoid it. Giving recognition
to the good faith of the other party seems to require that the guardian at
least establish that enforcement of the obligation would in some way endan-
ger the interests on the basis of which the guardian was appointed.
If the court finds that the other party entered into the transaction in bad
faith-if he had actual notice of the guardianship, for example-the guar-
dian should be permitted to avoid the transaction without an inquiry into
either contractual capacity or damage to the estate. The social interest in
preventing individuals from dealing with a ward when they are aware of the
guardian's existence would justify this result.
There is a danger, of course, that requiring de novo investigations will
lead to a significant increase in litigation. This, together with the fact that
if the substantive changes suggested above have been effectively implemented
the original proceeding will have included a thorough investigation of the
ward's capacity, seems to justify raising presumptions that the ward, if
under active guardianship, lacks contractual capacity and that the trans-
action is void. By placing on the third party the burden of producing evi-
dence of the ward's capacity and the transaction's fairness, frivolous litiga-
tion will be discouraged and there will be more assurance that the court
asked to determine the issues will have before it sufficient evidence on which
to base its decision.
Under most present statutes, the contract of a person for whom a guar-
dian has been appointed is theoretically void, without regard to the good
faith of the second party or to whether the contract is beneficial to the
estate."5 Because of the unfairness which would result from a literal applica-
tion of the theoretical rule, however, courts have developed a number of ex-
ceptions. But the confusion caused by the lack of a theoretical basis for the
general rule as well as the exceptions suggests that the entire statutory
scheme could valuably be revised. If the approach suggested in this note
were adopted, such factors as the ward's actual contractual capacity, the
good faith of the party with whom the ward dealt, the effect of the contract
on the estate, and the reason for the appointment of the guardian, would be
properly considered in the determination of the enforceability of contracts
of the ward. The results achieved would be equitable not only to the estate
of the ward but also to innocent parties with whom the ward contracts.
85. See, e.g., In re O'Donnell's Estate, 85 Cal. App. 2d 1, 192 P.2d 94 (1948);
Evans v. York, 195 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1946). Contra, In re Nelson's Estate, 329 Ill.
App. 243, 67 N.E.2d 698 (1946). See also Virtue, Restitution from the Mentally In-
firm, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 132, 141-42 (1951).
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